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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
power over structures that completely span waterways suggests that
Congress no longer considers the delegation unconstitutional." Conse-
quently, the Act currently is more ambiguous than when passed in 1899.
The only means of determining the proper interpretation of the sections
is for Congress to amend the Act and clarify the meaning of sections 9
and 10.
Amending the Act not only will clarify the meaning of sections 9 and
10 but also will prevent needless litigation over the proper interpreta-
tion of the sections." Repetitive litigation to determine whether the
Corps properly issued permits under section 10 is wasteful. Passage of a
comprehensive act clarifying sections 9 and 10 would eliminate super-




Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence excludes evidence of
subsequent repairs by a defendant when offered to prove the negligence
or culpable conduct of a defendant in a tort action.' Congress enacted
Act of 1920, Congress delegated the authority for licensing the construction of dams to the
Federal Power Commission (FPC). The FPC, however, cannot issue a license for a dam
unless the Corps approves the plans. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1976). In 1946 Congress enacted the
General Bridge Act which delegated Congress' bridge-approval authority to the Corps.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601 § 501, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 525 (1976)). In 1966, Congress removed the Corps' bridge-approval authority
and gave the authority to the Secretary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(3), (6) (1976).
The Corps still must approve the plans, however, before the Secretary of Transportation
can issue a bridge permit. Id In addition, with the enactment of the Department of
Transportation Act, Congress also vested causeway approval power in the Secretary of
Transportation. Id. The Secretary of Transportation then delegated his authority to issue
permits for bridges and causeways to the United States Coast Guard. 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(c)(9)
(1980); see Sisselman v. Smith, 432 F.2d 750, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1970) (recognizing Secretary of
Transportation's authority to transfer bridge-approval power to Coast Guard).
" See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra (reason for Congress' retention of § 9 ap-
proval powers).
I Environmentalists recently have focused on the ambiguity of § 9 and § 10. The
groups have challenged the Corps' interpretation in an attempt to halt projects they con-
sider undesirable. See notes 25 & 28 (synopsis of cases brought by environmentalists to
challenge Corps' interpretation of § 9 and § 10).
FED. R. EVID. 407. Rule provides:
Subsequent Remedial Measures-When, after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
1981]
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Rule 407 to encourage amelioration of dangerous conditions by prevent-
ing plaintiffs from using evidence of subsequent improvements to
establish culpability in lawsuits.2 The Rule specifically admits repair
evidence, however, if the defendant controverts the feasibility of making
the repair2 Negligence or culpable conduct is not an element of the tort
of strict liability.4 Therefore, Rule 407 does not as clearly limit admissi-
bility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability ac-
tions as it does in negligence actions.' Under either negligence or strict
liability theory, a manufacturer may be liable for damages suffered as a
result of an inadequate warning accompanying a prescription drug.' In
Werner v. Upjohn Co.,7 the Fourth Circuit examined whether evidence
of subsequent change in a prescription drug warning was admissible
under a feasibility or strict liability exception to Rule 407. The Fourth
Circuit held that evidence of the modified warning was not admissible
under either exception. The Werner court found that the defendant had
not controverted feasibility at trial,8 and due to the strong policy con-
siderations behind the Rule, the court refused to recognize a strict
liability exception to Rule 407.?
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the ex-
clusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
Id. Although Rule 407 applies to criminal as well as civil actions, see FED. R. EvID. 1101, only
the applicability of Rule 407 of civil tort actions will be considered in this note.
2 See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S., Jan. 13, 1981); Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. EVID. 407.
FED. R. EVID. 407. A repair is feasible if it is both economically practical and
technologically possible. See Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D.
1972); Note, Seller's Liability for Defective Design-The Measure of Responsibility, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 242 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Seller's Liability].
' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
I Courts have allowed admissabililty of evidence of subsequent repairs in strict liabil-
ity cases. See, e.g., Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th
Cir. 1977); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-51,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1974). See also PROSSER, supra note 4, § 75 at 494.
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT § 402A]. An inadequate warning accompanying a drug is a defect in the drug. Id. at
comments j and k. The manufacturer may be liable for damages caused by a defect under
negligence theory. See Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam);
Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D. Md. 1975), affd per curiam, 567
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 88, 273 N.W.2d 476,
479 (1979). A drug manufacturer may also be liable for a defective drug under strict liability
theory. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1969); RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra.
628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S., Jan. 13, 1981).
Id. at 851-55.
Id. at 855-58.
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Werner brought a diversity action against his physician, Dr. Carbo,
and the Upjohn Company (Upjohn) to recover damages for injuries re-
ceived after taking an antibiotic known as Cleocin. ° The drug was
manufactured by Upjohn and prescribed by Dr. Carbo.11 The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved the drug for general use in 1970.12
As the use of the drug increased, Upjohn began to receive reports of
serious side effects from Cleocin use.13 Upjohn notified the FDA of the
reports, and Upjohn and independent researchers conducted further
studies of the drug." Upjohn issued a warning in 1974 of the possibility
of pseudomembraneous colitis (PMC) resulting from Cleocin use.1 5 The
results of the studies prompted Upjohn to revise the warnings again in
1975.16 The plaintiff first visited Dr. Carbo, however, before Upjohn had
released the revised 1975 warning. Dr. Carbo prescribed Cleocin for
treatment of a cyst on plaintiffs eyelid.17 After using the drug for a
10 Id. at 851. The generic name of Cleocin is Clindamycin HCI. Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. Section 355 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act establishes the re-
quirements for approval of new drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before
they may be introduced into commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976). The manufacturer must sub-
mit the following to the Secretary of the FDA: full reports of investigations made of the
drug's effectiveness and safety; the components of the drug; the composition of the drug; a
full description of the methods, facilities, and controls used in the manufacture, processing,
and packing of the drug; samples of the drug and its components; and examples of proposed
labeling. Id. § 355(b). The Secretary reviews the material and approves the application or
gives the applicant an opportunity to present evidence at a hearing. Id. at § 355(c). The
Secretary may withdraw his approval if he later finds that the drug is unsafe. Id. at § 355(e).
The statute further requires that the applicant maintain records of reports of clinical ex-
perience and other information concerning the drug. Id. § 355(j)(1). The Secretary has access
to these records upon request. Id. § 355(j)(2). FDA regulations are merely minimum stand-
ards, however, and do not ensure "foolproof" drugs. See Kessler, Products Liability, 76
YALE L.J. 887, 931 (1967).
13 628 F.2d at 851. The side effects of Cleocin include diarrhea and colitis. Id. Colitis is
inflammation of the colon, or large intestine. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 297 (4th
Lawyer's Ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as STEDMAN'S].
1, 628 F.2d at 851. Cleocin was reported to cause pseudomembranous colitis (PMC) in
some patients. Id. PMC, usually caused by staphylococcus bacteria, occurs most commonly
as a postoperative complication due to shock or due to prolonged antibiotic therapy. See
STEDMAN'S, supra note 13, at 466. Diarrhea and nausea are symptoms of PMC. Id. Experts
originally thought that the incidence of PMC was low in Cleocin users, but a study published
in late 1973 found signs of PMC in 10 percent of a test group that took the drug. Werner did
not allege that the PMC found by the study was of the same type which later infected him.
Id. at 851-52.
" 628 F.2d at 852. In the summer of 1974, Upjohn issued the warning in the package in-
sert of Cleocin and in letters to every physician in the United States. Id.
Is Id. at 851. The 1974 warning cautioned that "severe and persistent diarrhea" had
been reported and that the drug "should be discontinued" when significant diarrhea oc-
curred. Id at 852. The 1975 warning indicated that Cleocin "can cause severe colitis which
may end fatally." Id. at 853.
11 Id. at 852. The plaintiff also sued Dr. Carbo for malpractice in the district court ac-
tion. Id. at 851. The parties in Werner contested the scope of Dr. Carbo's instructions to the
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week, plaintiff developed nausea."8 Although he stopped using the drug,
Werner soon experienced severe dehydration and diarrhea. Eventually,
a large portion of his colon had to be removed.19
At trial, Werner alleged that the 1974 warning inadequately disclosed
the information available to Upjohn at the time the warning was released.
In light of the defective warning, the plaintiff asserted that Cleocin was
unreasonably dangerous and Upjohn was negligent." Upjohn argued
that the incidence of Cleocin's side effects was quite low and that if the
plaintiff had received proper and timely treatment from Dr. Carbo,
plaintiff would not have suffered permanent injury.21 Upjohn further
claimed that all of the plaintiff's reactions were encompassed in the 1974
warning."2
The plaintiff introduced Upjohn's expanded 1975 caveat into evi-
dence to support his allegation that the 1974 warning inadequately ad-
vised prescribing physicians of Cleocin's side effects." Although Upjohn
moved to exclude all reference to the 1975 warning, the district court
allowed the warning to be admitted. The trial judge instructed the jury
that they were not to consider the 1975 warning on the issue of negli-
gence or culpable conduct, but only on the issue of feasibility.24 Never-
plaintiff. Dr Carbo claimed that he warned the plaintiff that he might experience nausea,
vomiting, or diarrhea. Dr. Carbo also claimed that he instructed the plaintiff to decrease the
dosage by half if he experienced any adverse reactions. The plaintiff denied that Dr. Carbo
had made either of the statements. Id. at 852. The jury found Dr. Carbo guilty of negligence
in his method of prescribing the drug. Id. at 851. Dr. Carbo appealed the decision. Id The
Fourth Circuit in Werner vacated the judgment against Dr. Carbo and remanded the case
for consideration without the admission of the evidence of the warning change. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that although Werner focused on the adequacy of Upjohn's warning, Dr.
Carbo's duty to instruct his patient was so closely related to Upjohn's warning that the
judgment against Dr. Carbo could not stand. Id- at 860.
Id. at 852.
Id. In January of 1975, another doctor examined the plaintiff and discontinued other
drugs prescribed by Dr. Carbo that Upjohn discouraged for use with Cleocin in its 1974
warning. Id.; see STEDMAN'S, supra note 13, at 1283. After the removal of his colon, the plain-
tiff underwent other operations to restore his execretory functions. At the time of his ap-
peal, Werner was under dietary restrictions, had diarrhea, and could not engage in
strenuous physical activity. 628 F.2d at 852.
0 Id- at 852-53. Plaintiff argued that even if the warning itself were adequate, the
warning's adequacy was negated by Upjohn's advertising and the activities of Upjohn's
sales representatives. Id. See also Sterling Drug Co. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (8th
Cir. 1969) (duty of sales representatives to disseminate drug manufacturer's warnings to
physicians).
21 628 F.2d at 852. Pharmaceutical manufacturers may be held liable for damages due
to a physician's failure to read warnings, if the warnings themselves were not reasonable or
if the method chosen to alert physicians to the warnings were inadequate. See Sterling
Drug Co. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099,
1109 (Colo. App. 1976).
2 628 F.2d at 852.
SId. at 853.
24 I&
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theless, the jury found Upjohn negligent in failing to warn physicians
properly of Cleocin's side effects,' and Upjohn appealed."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that Upjohn did not controvert
whether the information in the 1975 caveat feasibly could have been in-
cluded in the 1974 warning.' During negotiations with the FDA on the
exact language of the 1974 warning, Upjohn had made two statements
claiming that language suggested by the FDA for the 1974 warning was
misleading.' In the first statement Upjohn proposed the substitution of4"can occur" for "more rarely [occur]," the phrase suggested by the FDA.
Upjohn contended to the agency that PMC resulted more often than in-
dicated by the indefinite term "rarely" would indicate.' The FDA also
had requested that Upjohn include a caution that Cleocin not be used for
minor infections. In the second statement, Upjohn had contested the
necessity of the caution because of the limitations already included in
the warning. 0 The Fourth Circuit found that Upjohn's suggestions ac-
tually strengthened and clarified the warning. The court determined
that Upjohn had not argued that it was infeasible to write a stronger
warning, but that the warning adequately conveyed all information
Id at 851. In addition to finding Upjohn negligent, the jury found that Dr. Carbo was
negligent in prescribing Cleocin and that his negligence proximately caused or contributed
to Werner's injury. The jury also found Upjohn negligent in selling Cleocin and that this
negligence proximately caused or contributed to Werner's injuries. Id Upjohn also breached
an implied or express warranty in its sale of Cleocin to Dr. Carbo. Id- Upjohn was not liable
in strict liability for marketing an unreasonably dangerous drug. Id The Fourth Circuit
recognized that the verdict for Upjohn on the issue of strict liability was inconsistent with
the verdicts against Upjohn on the negligence and breach of warranty issues. Id at 860. The
Fourth Circuit held that the admissibility of the evidence of the 1975 warning so influenced
the disposition of all of the claims that all judgments must be vacated and remanded. Id.
i at 851. Upjohn appealed on the grounds that the 1975 warning was improperly
admitted and the Dr. Carbo's admitted failure to read the 1974 warning abrogated Upjohn's
liability. Id Dr. Garbo appealed on the grounds that Werner had not established the basic
elements of a malpractice case. Id Both Upjohn and Garbo appealed the trial court's refusal
to include a jury instruction on contributory negligence and to reduce the $400,000 damage
award to present value. Id Werner cross-appealed that trial court's refusal to allow
evidence to support punitive damages. Id Because of the overwhelming impact of the
evidence, however, the Fourth Circuit focused only on the admissibility of the subsequent
warning in Werner. Id at 860.
1 Id at 855. "If controverted" means that the defendant must first deny control,
ownership, or feasibility in order for the plaintiff to introduce the evidence. See FED. R.
EvID. 407; SALTZBURG & REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 162-63 (2d ed. 1977);
text accompanying notes 1-4 supra. The Fourth Circuit found that the defendant must ac-
tually raise the issue of feasibility in order for the exception to Rule 407 to apply. Mere
failure to make a pre-trial concession to the feasibility of the warning does not mean that
the issue is controverted. 628 F.2d at 855.
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available in 1974.32 Furthermore, the plaintiff used the 1975 warning at
trial not merely in connection with feasibility, but in a direct attempt to
prove antecedent negligence." In his closing argument, the plaintiff
cliamed that Upjohn knew of the dangers of Cleocin and delayed making
a change in the warning until March 1975 in order to maximize profits.u
The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff's closing arguments clearly
violated Rule 407.
35
The Fourth Circuit's holding that the evidence of the subsequent
warning should be inadmissible to prove Upjohn's negligence is consis-
tent with the wording and policy of Rule 407. The plaintiff clearly failed
to show that Upjohn controverted the feasibility of implementing an im-
proved warning. Reversible error occurred when Werner exceeded the
judge's allowance of the subsequent warning to show feasibility and used
the 1975 warning to show antecedent negligence. On the basis of this er-
ror, the Fourth Circuit correctly reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
3 1
In addition to the negligence claim, Werner argued that the evidence
of the 1975 warning was admissible under strict liability theory." Strict
liability enables a plaintiff injured by a defective product to recover
I Id If a defendant does not raise the issue of feasibility, the trial court is entitled to
weigh the need for evidence of subsequent repair against the risk that the jury may im-
properly infer negligence from it. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 n.3.
(9th Cir. 1961). The Fourth Circuit determined that the jury could have improperly inferred
negligence, and that this important policy consideration of Rule 407 overshadowed the plain-
tiff's need for the evidence. 628 F.2d at 856; see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 275, at 668-69 (2d ed. 1972).
1 628 F.2d at 854.
Id The plaintiff claimed that the limiting instruction given by the district court
made any use of the 1975 warning harmless error. Id. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the
Fourth Circuit held that Werner could not offer damaging evidence for a limited purpose,
use if for a forbidden purpose over objection, and then insulate reversal by a limiting in-
struction at the close of the case. Id. Alternatively, the plaintiff contended that Upjohn had
waived any objection to Werner's use of the 1975 warning because Upjohn failed to state
specific grounds for its objection at trial. Id. at 853. The Fourth Circuit, however, found that
the ground for objection was clear from Upjohn's pretrial motion requesting that all
references to the 1975 warning be suppressed. Id; see FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (timely objec-
tion to strike must be made unless specific ground of objection is apparent from content).
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if Upjohn had objected during plaintiff's closing
arguments, the objection would have only emphasized the impermissible point to the jury.
628 F.2d at 854, citing Leathers v. General Motors Corp., 546 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1976)
(defendant not required to object to damaging argument during plaintiff's closing
argument).
1 628 F.2d at 851. The district court in Werner abused its discretion by failing to con-
sider whether the plaintiff had not offered the evidence simply to permit the jury to make
and improper inference of negligence. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 407[03] (1979) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER]. Abuse of discretion by
a trial court in determining admissibility of evidence can be reversible error. See Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 n.3 (9th Cir. 1961).
628 F.2d at 856.
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damages from the manufacturer without proof of the negligence or
culpable conduct of the manufacturer. 8 The plaintiff must prove only
that the product was defective in order to recover for his injuries. 9
Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures only if
introduced to prove the negligence or culpable conduct of the defend-
ant." The exceptions listed in Rule 407 which allow evidence proving
ownership, control, feasibility, or impeachment are illustrative, but not
exhaustive.4' Courts that admit evidence of subsequent repair hold that
strict liability claims constitute another exception to the Rule.4" Strict
liability requires the manufacturer to bear the costs of damages caused
by his products because the manufacturer is acting for his own purpose
in seeking a benefit or profit from the sale of his product. The manufac-
turer is in a better ecnomic position than the victim to bear the cost of
injuries by passing the cost to the public in his prices.
4 3
In Werner, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the consumer protec-
tion policy which underlies strict liability theory.4 The Fourth Circuit
refused to expand the exceptions to Rule 407 in strict liability claims.
4
The court found that Congress, in enacting Rule 407, had determined
that evidence of subsequent precautions should be excluded in cases in-
' See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.
1977); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-51, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1974); Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875
(1976); Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837,
837-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Subsequent Repairs]; Seller's Liability, supra note 3, at
237-38.
' See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962); Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div.2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875
(1976); RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6, comment g; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Lia-
bilityforProducts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,829 (1972); Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 837-40;
Seller's Liability, supra note 3, at 237. The strict liability plaintiff must prove that a defect
in the product caused the plaintiff physical harm, that the seller is engaged in the business
of selling the product, and that the product reached the plaintiff without substantial change
in the condition in which the product was sold. See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6. The
seller is held to strict liability regardless of his exercise of due care or the absence of any
contract between the plaintiff and the seller. Id.
40 FED. R. EVID. 407, see note 1 supra.
" 628 F.2d at 856; Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. EVID. 407. The Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes state that the listed exceptions to the exclusionary rule are merely ex-
amples. Id.
" See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792-93 (8th Cir.
1977) (subsequent remedial warning admissible against cattle feed manufacturer in strict
liability action); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 113 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148,
1153, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1974) (manufacturer's subsequent change of metal used in gear
box admissible in strict liability); Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870,
875 (1976) (General Motor's issuance of recall letters after accident admissible in strict
liability claim).
,s See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 494-96; Seller's Liability, supra note 3, at 239-40.
" See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
628 F.2d at 856.
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volving negligent as well as culpable conduct.46 Since a manufacturer's
conduct under strict liability is technically less blameworthy than
negligent or culpable conduct, by excluding evidence of subsequent
repair to prove culpable conduct, Congress must have also intended the
exclusions to apply to the less blameworthy strict liability conduct." The
Fourth Circuit further stated that the congressional purpose in enacting
Rule 407 would be thwarted if the evidence were admitted under either
negligence or strict liability theories because the manufacturer's inclina-
tion to make subsequent repairs would be repressed in both cases. 8
The assumption that admissibility of subsequent remedial measures
would discourage defendants from making necessary repairs might be
erroneous. Manufacturers of mass-produced products may not be as
callous as the exclusionary rule assumes.4 9 Few insured defendants will
refrain from making subsequent repairs to avoid future accidents."0 A
manufacturer with a large number of products on the market has an in-
centive to effect repairs because the evidence of earlier accidents would
be admissible in a subsequent suit to show that the defendant knew of
the dangerous condition." Therefore, admissibility of evidence of a
subsequent repair will not adversely influence the manufacturer's deci-
sion whether to effect subsequent remedial measures. Economic self-
interest will prompt most manufacturers to make subsequent repairs,
whether or not the manufacturer loses a judgment in the interim.2
" Id. at 856-57.
I d The Werner court defined culpable conduct as conduct that is blameworthy and
reprehensible, or involves a breach of a legal duty. Id; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed.
1968). From this definition, the court determined that culpable conduct is worse than
negligence or strict liability conduct. 628 F.2d at 856-58. Nevertheless, the conduct of the
seller is not at issue in a strict liability action. See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6.
Therefore, even if culpable conduct is worse than strict liability conduct, Rule 407 still does
not directly apply in a strict liability action. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
628 F.2d at 857.
" See Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 848. Commentators have criticized the
use of Rule 407 exclusions in products liability actions. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 36, 407[2] (Rule 407 could be eliminated with no great loss to defendants); Subsequent
Repairs, supra note 38, at 849-50 (Rule 407 considered obsolete).
I See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, 407[2]. The insured is motivated to limit
future damages due to faulty products in order to minimize his insurance premiums. Id
s' See FED. R. EVID. 404; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, 407[21; Subsequent
Repairs, supra note 38, at 848-49. In addition to anxiety over the possibility of future
damage judgments, manufacturers' concern for consumer protection is encouraged by the
activities of consumer organizations and federal agencies, as well as by mass media ex-
posure of the defects. These factors prompt manufacturers to engage in research and make
subsequent repairs. See Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 848-49.
5 The common law codified in Rule 407 was originally developed to protect land-
owners from liability for injuries on their property. See Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v.
Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892). The rule which protects owners in cases of a single ac-
cident on their land is inappropriate when applied to modern marketplace conditions where
an unknowing public buys the products. See Prosser, The Fall of the Ciladel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966).
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Several courts admit evidence of remedial repairs in strict liability
actions.0 Other courts, however, accept evidence of subsequent repairs
under strict liability theory only for the limited purpose of demonstrat-
ing feasibility and then only if the defendant has first disputed the
issue." This use of the feasibility exception to the exclusionary rule,
however, ignores the purpose of the Rule.55 In negligence, the distinction
between evidence offered to prove feasibility and culpability is valid
because feasibility evidence focuses on the product while culpability
evidence focuses on the defendant's conduct.56 In strict liability,
however, the evidence is used solely to prove a defect, not culpability.
The purpose of the feasibility evidence in both types of cases is to prove
the existence of a defect.57 Since the evidence is not being used to prove
culpability, the requirement that the exception to the exclusionary rule
be allowed only if the defendant disputes feasibility is unsound.' The "if
controverted" requirement does not protect the defendant because
culpability is not at issue and, moreover, harms the plaintiff because ex-
clusion restricts a valuable evidentiary tool.55 Therefore, regardless of
whether Upjohn controverted feasibility under the negligence claim, the
evidence should have been admitted under Werner's strict liability
claim.
Evidence of subsequent repairs is relevant 0 to prove that the prod-
uct was unreasonably"1 unsafe under negligence and strict liability
theories to prove both feasibility and adequacy of the warning.62 Rule
" See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.
1977); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 814 (1974); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 193 Colo. App. 211, -, 565 P.2d 217, 224
(1977); McCaffrey v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 71 Ill. App. 3d 42, 50, 388 N.E.2d 1062, 1069
(1979); Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (1976).
1 See Cunningham v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 498, 500, 350 N.E.2d 514, 516-17
(1976); LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 45, 355 N.E.2d 533, 535
(1976).
1 See Note, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule: Admission of Evidence of
Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability, 29 AM. U.L.
REV. 135, 157-58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Renovated Repair Rule].
f8 Id.
57 Id.
" See Hull v. Enger Constr. Co., 15 Wash. App. 511, 518-519, 550 P.2d 692, 697 (1976)
(either plaintiff or defendant can place feasibility in controversy); Brown v. Quick Mix Co.,
75 Wash. 2d 833, -., 454 P.2d 205, 210 (1969) (evidence of feasibility can be first introduced
in either plaintiffs or defendant's case); Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 55, at 157.
' See Costello & Weinberger, The Subsequent Repair Doctrine and Products Liabil-
ity, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 463, 499 (1979).
' Any fact tending to make more probable the existence of a material fact is relevant
and potentially admissible into evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 401; see generally C. McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275(g), at 666 (2d ed. 1972).
"1 See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6, at (1). In strict liability, a manufacturer is
liable for physical harm caused by a defective product which is unreasonably dangerous. Id.
2 See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 55, at 172-73; Subsequent Repairs, supra
note 38, at 849-50.
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407, however, does not allow evidence of subsequent repairs to be admit-
ted to prove the defendant's negligence because of Congress' decision to
encourage remedial repair. 3 In strict liability, evidence of subsequent
repairs is relevant to prove that a manufacturer's warning is inadequate
and unreasonable.6 The evidence aids the trier-of-fact in defining a stand-
ard of reasonable safety against which to compare the injury-causing
product. 5 The trier-of-fact cannot construe the evidence as an admission
of the defendant's negligence, since negligence is not an issue under a
strict liability claim.6 Furthermore, any possibility that the trier-of-fact
will misconstrue the evidence is limited since evidence of remedial
repair is merely one of several factors which determine the adequacy of
the warning. 7
The Fourth Circuit held evidence of subsequent repairs inadmissible
to prove the inadequacy of the 1974 warning under a strict liability
theory." The exclusion of such evidence should not be extended to in-
clude strict liability cases because the policy considerations underlying
strict liability conflict with those underlying Rule 407.69 Not only is the
pharmaceutical manufacturer in the best position to spread the cost
among the general public," he is also in the best position to take positive
measures to warn physicians about the dangers of his drugs.71 A patient
relies on his doctor for safe health care,72 and in turn, the doctor must rely
See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
See Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 853-54.
6 See Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 57 Tenn. App. 206, 213-14, 417 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1966)
(jury allowed to use evidence of subsequent repairs to determine if repairs were required to
bring stairs within minimum industry standards as established by expert testimony);
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, 1 407(05); Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 55, at
173; Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 850; see also Rosin v. International Havester
Co., 262 Minn. 445, __ , 115 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1962) (plaintiff's expert compared original part
to improved part to aid jury to determine adequacy of original part).
" See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 55, at 172-73; Subsequent Repairs, supra
note 38, at 850-51.
"7 See Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 850-51. The plaintiff will usually offer the
testimony of experts as the main proof that the product did not meet reasonable industry
standards. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1974); Rosin v. International Harvester Co., 262 Minn. 445, 453, 115
N.W.2d 50, 55 (1962); Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 57 Tenn. App. 206, 213-14, 417 S.W.2d 568,
571 (1966). Although the evidence of remedial repair may not prove the inadequacy of the
warning by itself, the evidence is still relevant. Evidence having "any tendency" to make
"any fact" more or less probable is relevant. See FED. R. EvID. 401; SALTZBURG & REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 102 (2d ed. 1977).
628 F.2d at 858.
" See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
7 See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 494-95. The manufacturer may recoup costs by raising
his price on each of his products. Id. But see Seller's Liability, supra note 3, at 239-40 n.13.
71 See Baker v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 70 App. Div. 2d 400, 405, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (1979).
72 See id. at 404-05, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85. A patient cannot reasonably expect risk-free
health care. Even if a drug is properly manufactured, there is no guarantee that a drug will
be both effective and safe. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 991. A drug must be toxic, having
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
on the pharmaceutical firm for adequate warnings. ' Pharmaceutical
firms, like other manufacturers, are subject to market pressures to offer
the best products possible. 4 This market pressure encourages the drug
manufacturer to change his warnings to reflect current knowledge
regardless of the exclusionary rule. 5 Therefore, Werner implicitly re-
jects the strict liability policy of placing the economic burden of product
defects on the party who can best bear the cost, the seller.", By declining
to accept the consumer protection policy of risk-spreading under strict
liability and by extending the policy embodied in Rule 407 to strict
liability actions, the Fourth Circuit has placed federal procedural law in
conflict with state substantive law." The Werner court incorrectly ex-
tended Rule 407 to apply to state substantive policy in strict liability
cases.
7 8
the potential to inflict serious harm, in order to effectively combat diseases. See Note, The
Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 742 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Adverse Drug Reactions]. Certain
drugs are so toxic that they are unavoidably unsafe. The manufacturer of unavoidably un-
safe drugs escapes liability, however, if the drug is properly prepared and accompanied by
an adequate warning because the medicinal value of the drug outweighs its risk. See
RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6, at comment k.
,1 See Baker v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 70 App. Div. 2d 400, 405, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 84-85
(1979). The patient's doctor is a "learned intermediary" between the patient and the
manufacturer. If properly warned of a side effect, the doctor has an excellent chance of
preventing injury to the plaintiff. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th
Cir. 1966).
" See Subsequent Repairs, supra note 38, at 848-49; note 51 supra. But see Adverse
Drug Reactions, supra note 72, at 755 (drug manufacturers may not be able to pass along
costs of strict liability because of extensive testing requirements).
, See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6, at comment h. Even though pharmaceutical
firms are unable to make a perfectly safe drug, they can warn the public of the dangers and
reactions of which the manufacturers have knowledge. Id.; see text accompanying notes
49-52 supra.
," See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 6. The seller is liable for physical injury to any
"ultimate user or consumer" caused by the defective product. Id. The term "seller" includes
manufacturers, wholesale or retail dealers, and distributors. All can be held liable for
damages caused by the defect. Id. at comment f.
" Werner was a diversity action. 628 F.2d at 851. The law of the forum state,
Maryland, should have been applied in Werner. See id at 848; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Maryland recognized actions for damages in strict liability. See Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). The Maryland Court of
Appeals in Phipps recognized that the seller is in a better position than the consumer to
take precautions and protect against defects, as well as spread the risks. Id. at 352, 363 A.2d
at 963.
,' When federal and state law conflict in a diversity action, a federal court must follow
state substantive law rather than federal procedural law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This rule is especially important where the difference between the state
and federal laws affects the outcome of the action. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945). Outcome, however, is not the only factor to be considered by the court. If the
conflict amounts to a mere procedural difference which is not "bound up with the righs and
obligations" of the parties, federal procedural law applies. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
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